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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the importance of institutions vis-à-vis openness and trade 
policies in determining per-capita income differences across countries. A recent 
literature has tried to demonstrate that more open economies grow faster. On the other 
hand it has also been asserted that it is not openness per-se, but institutions and good 
governance that matter in promoting growth. This paper attempts to test this 
hypothesis across a cross-section of nations. Unlike other papers in the field we have 
tested not only for the degree of openness but also for trade policy indicators as well 
as a fuller set of six institutional variables. Our broad finding is that although 
institutions matter, trade policies are also relevant to promoting growth, whereas 
openness per se has little impact on growth.
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21 Introduction
In poor low-income nations economic growth constitutes the principal avenue for 
poverty reduction. Redistribution, even when feasible, can never be enough on its own 
to substantially reduce poverty. Despite the fact that there may be a close link between 
growth and poverty reduction; growth may result not just from policies that foster it 
like trade policy reforms, but because certain nations have superior institutions within 
which the policy framework is determined and executed. This also raises the issue of 
reverse causality. Higher incomes that are the result of growth in the context of well-
functioning institutions, in turn also produce superior institutions that are a function of 
increased per-capita income. By institutions we imply factors that result in good 
governance: political stability, voice and accountability, the rule of law, the regulatory 
framework, bureaucratic quality and the control of corruption (see Kaufmann, Kraay 
and Zoido-Lobaton, 2002 for example). There is little controversy over the imperative 
role played by both international trade and institutional quality in fostering growth. 
Economic development is a phenomenon which encompasses a multitude of social, 
economic, political and scientific phenomenon. In practice, accounting for all of these 
factors in order to explain growth is a difficult task.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the contribution of trade policy in 
explaining differences in per-capita income levels across countries. We live in an era 
of globalisation which makes greater openness imperative. In addition we also analyse 
the relative contribution of institutions to prosperity compared to trade liberalisation.
With regard to international trade and growth, it has to be remembered that trade can 
increase or decrease in the absence of any changes to the trade policy stance (tariffs, 
3non-tariff barriers, export subsidies etc.).1 Globalisation, factors that are external to an 
individual nation, may facilitate trade. Technological changes may make certain 
goods, say imports, cheaper despite trade restrictions. Similarly, a fall in 
transportation costs or the end of war may alter the relative price of tradables 
encouraging more international trade. Trade may promote growth but changes in trade 
policies may not foster more international trade and hence not contribute to growth or 
poverty reduction.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the 
literature covering the debate regarding the alternative impact of trade policy or 
openness on growth, with some authors establishing a direct link between openness 
and growth, whilst others emphasise the role of good institutions. Sections 3 (data and 
methodology) and 4 (regressions) contain our contribution to the debate. We go well 
beyond the analysis of Rodrik et al (2004) by including more institutional measures, 
openness indicators, as well as trade policy variables. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Trade Policy, Openness and Institutions 
Where do the fundamental determinants of growth lie? Apart from the effort required 
in savings or capital accumulation, do the fundamental determinants of growth lie in 
policies such as trade policy or human capital accumulation or is growth fostered by 
good institutions? In an influential paper, Sachs and Warner (1995) argued that 
countries that were more open (based upon a number of openness indicators) grew 
faster than countries that were not open, hence creating pre-conditions for poverty 
1 By trade policy we mean governmentally induced mechanisms that restrict, relax or facilitate the international exchange of 
certain or all goods and services. 
4reduction. A country was classified as not open based upon violation of any of the 
indicators. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), however, have convincingly argued that the 
Sachs and Warner (1995) study suffered from sample selection bias and that some 
openness indicators could be highly correlated to other indicators of good governance 
or institutional quality. As an example of the first problem, countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa failed to be counted as open as most of them had state monopolies controlling 
the export trade. This is not true because “open” economies as defined by Sachs and 
Warner (1995), such as Indonesia also had state monopolies in petroleum for 
example. Secondly, another indicator of the lack of openness a black market premium 
on the exchange rate could be highly related to institutional quality (corruption, 
regulatory capacity). Most damaging of the Rodriguez and Rodrik critique of Sachs 
and Warner’s assertion that openness promotes growth lies in the fact that an Africa 
dummy variable capturing the special effect of Africa on cross-national growth could 
be substituted for the two crucial openness indicators that contributed significantly to 
growth.
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) went on to review some of the key cross-national 
empirical literature on the relationship between trade policy and economic growth and 
conclude that there is little evidence that open trade policies, in the sense of lower 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, are significantly associated with economic 
growth. The theory on this relationship, in the case of a small economy that takes 
world prices of tradable goods as given, would predict that: (1) in static models with 
no market imperfections and other pre-existing distortions, the effect of a trade 
restriction is to reduce the level of real GDP at world prices. In the presence of market 
failures such as externalities, trade restrictions may increase real GDP (although they 
5are hardly ever the first-best means of doing so); (2) in standard models with 
exogenous technological change and diminishing returns to reproducible factors of 
production, a trade restriction has no effect on the long-run (steady-state) 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) have evaluated the role of institutions and international trade 
in economic development. They provide evidence that countries with better 
institutions and countries that trade more grow faster. However, they have concluded 
that it is trade which matters more in this nexus as a short term pro-growth strategy. 
Institutions matter in the long-run. But this conclusion is rejected by Rodrik et al 
(2002), who find that the quality of institutions ‘trumps every thing else’. They 
conclude that when institutions are controlled for, the measures of integration have at 
best insignificant effects on the level of per-capita income. But there is a potential 
reverse causality between per-capita income levels or growth and institutions. For 
example richer and more developed countries have better institutions and they are 
more liberalised than more underdeveloped nations. So a pertinent question can be 
raised whether rich countries are rich because they are more open and have better 
institutions or does the relationship work in reverse? There is also a debate whether 
better institutions encourage trade or is it openness and liberalisation which eventually 
bring improvements to institutions? There is a bit of evidence to suggest that both 
possibilities exist (see for example: Anderson and Mercuiller, 1999; and Wei, 2000). 
Figure 1 below elaborates how the inter relationship between growth, institutions and 
trade works In short theory and literature both imply that any analysis, which attempts 
to capture the effects of institutions and openness on growth, would be loaded with 
the problems of endogeniety and reverse causation: “The extent to which an economy 
6is integrated with the rest of the world and the quality of its institutions are both 
endogenous, shaped potentially not just by each other but also by income levels.  
Problems of endogeniety and reverse causality plague any empirical researcher trying 
to make sense of relationship among these causal factors (Rodrik et al, 2004:2).” 
Fortunately, there are econometric techniques to address this endogeneity problem.
 Figure 1:  Non Linearity of Institutions and Integration  
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Secondly, not all institutions may matter. Democracy and voice and accountability 
may not always contribute to growth, as has been the case in rapidly growing nations 
such as China and Singapore, see Barro (1996).  There is also the issue of human 
capital and its place in fostering growth, and even aiding the formation of superior 
institutions. Glaeser et al (2004) bring forth an important missing link to the debate by 
suggesting that human capital is more important for growth than are institutions. In 
fact they went one step further by suggesting that human capital actually contributes 
towards institutional improvement. Their paper presents the view point whereby the 
potential of developing countries to grow depends more on the leadership (e.g. good 
or bad dictatorships) rather than institutional quality.
7On the importance of human capital vis-à-vis growth, Schiff (1999), after reviewing 
recent empirical studies on the subject concludes that poor countries can only grow 
faster than rich countries if their initial stock of human capital exceeds the average 
level among other poor nations. For example, if East Asian and South Asian 
economies are compared, differences in human capital and differences in convergence 
level seem to move together. For instance, East Asian Developing countries witnessed 
unprecedented increases in GNP per capita over the last three decades, e.g. 10 times 
for Malaysia, 65 times for Republic of Korea and 13 times for Thailand. While during 
the same period for Asian least developed countries (Bhutan, Cambodia and Lao 
People’s democratic Republic) and South Asian developing countries (Bangladesh, 
India and Pakistan) only a meagre increase of 2 to a little over 5 times took place. 
It is intriguing to note that in 1960s when most of these countries were at similar 
stages of economic development, East Asian developing countries were far ahead of 
both Asian least developed countries and South Asian developing countries in human 
capital. In fact, the total literacy rates for East Asian developing countries in the 1960s 
were as high as 71 percent for the Republic of Korea, 68 percent for Thailand and 
even Malaysia had a rate of over 50 percent. On the other hand, in case of all Asian 
least developed countries and South Asian developing countries, the total literacy 
rates were as low as only 9 percent for Nepal and 15 percent for Pakistan with 
Cambodia having 38 percent literacy. After three decades, while Asian least 
developed countries and South Asian developing countries have some what 
ameliorated their human capital, the total literacy rates are still far below 50 percent in 
the cases of Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. During the same period, however, East 
Asian developing countries have more or less achieved the formidable task of 
8educating most of their people. As a result, in the late 1990s, the total literacy rate of 
the Republic of Korea has reached 98 percent, and Malaysia managed to achieve a 
rate of about 90 percent. In short, economic progress in East Asia during the 1980s 
occurred because of their well-developed human capital endowment which gathered  
momentum in the 1960s or earlier. 
3 Data and Methodology 
In the light of the debate above our growth equation2 comprises all the core 
determinants of growth, namely international economic integration (including 
measures of openness and trade policy), institutions and also human capital. We have 
also included physical capital: 
………………. (1)iiiiii PKHKTPNy  log
In many ways the equation above is an augmented neo-classical growth model. The 
variable is income per capita in country i, , , , and are respectively iy iN iTP iHK iPK
measures for institutions, integration, human capital and physical capital and  is the i
random error term. 
Human Capital is represented by average schooling years. In order to have an in-depth 
insight into how institutions or increased integration affects the growth potential of a 
country, we will employ several concepts of institutions and trade policy openness 
variables following various definitions prevalent in the literature. For example, we 
2 Strictly speaking we have per-capita income differences and not growth as in Rodrik et. Al (2004), 
but differences in average income are a consequence of varying past growth rates.  
9take into account the six different classifications of institutions identified by Kaufman 
et al (2002), namely rule of law (rl), political stability (ps), regulatory quality (rq), 
government effectiveness (ge), voice and accountability (va) and control of corruption 
(ctc).3 On the integration front, we have carefully chosen three specific measures of 
openness. For example, ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the 
conventional openness indicator (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 
2002; Rose 2002, Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004). Two other measures of 
openness are overall trade penetration (tarshov) derived from World Bank’s TARS 
system and overall import penetration (Impnov) respectively (see Rose, 2002). Neither 
of these measures are direct indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only 
towards the level of its participation in international trade. There are indicators of 
trade restrictiveness acting as measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et 
al, 2001, Rose 2002). Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on 
intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), and total import charges (Totimpov) can 
all be considered as good proxies of trade restrictiveness and have also been employed 
in this study. Other measures which capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff 
barriers. More over there is also a trend in the trade literature to use composite 
measures of trade policy. Edwards (1998) advocates the Sachs and Warner (1995) 
openness index (open80) and Leamer’s Openness indicator (leamer 82) as being 
apposite proxies of openness. We have also used these composite measures to 
examine in detail how openness influences growth rate. In short this study has 
employed 6 institutional and 8 openness/trade policy variables in an attempt to 
undertake a comprehensive analysis of how institutional quality and exposure to 
increased international trade affects the economic performance of a country.
3 The value of these variables range from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best) for every country in the sample.
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Note that unlike in the comparable study by Rodrik et al (2004) we have (a) included 
a role for human capital, (b) employed six institutional variables compared to one 
only in Rodrik et al (rule of law), (c) included trade policy variables and not just 
openness indicators and (d) expanded the set of openness measures employed. 
As indicated earlier, there are potential endogeneity problems between growth and 
institutions, as well as between openness (or trade policy) and growth. One way of 
cleansing our empirical analysis from endogeneity in explanatory variables and the 
reverse causality between dependent and independent variables is to adopt 
Instrumental Variable (IV) regression analysis.  As a first step to run IV regressions 
we have to find appropriate instruments for our 11-openness/ trade policy variables 
and 6 institutional concepts. The first stage estimation includes instruments for the 
two explanatory variables with potential endogeneity problems. The estimate in the 
next stage utilises the predicted variables of these variables for institutions and trade 
policy/openness in a standard growth regression as in (1). 
We followed previous studies, which have not only identified instruments for 
openness and institutions, but they have also run several robustness checks to validate 
the power of these instruments. The literature clearly establishes that predicted trade 
shares following Frankel and Romer (FR) (1999) from a gravity equation is the most 
appropriate instrument for openness/ trade policy. On the other hand, the most 
compelling institutional instrument is the measure of settler mortality suggested by 
Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson (2001). But the data is only available for 64 
countries. Though Rodrik et al (2004) have extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a 
11
relatively low number when compared to another widely used institutional instrument 
namely ‘fractions of the population speaking English and Western European 
languages as the first language’ which covers as many as 140 countries. Thus 
following Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use this instrument 
for our institutional proxies. Following Rodrik et al (2004), we employed ‘distance 
from the equator’ as a third instrument (proxy for geography) and is a purely 
exogenous concept.
Our IV regression model has two equations, where in the first stage we generate 
predicted values of openness/ trade policy and institutions by regressing them on a set 
of instruments. 
………………… (2)Niiiiiii GEOFREURENGN  
…………………(3)Niiiiiii GEOEURENGFRTP  
where  and are our instruments for institutions referring to fractions of iENG iEUR
population speaking English and European languages respectively. is instrument iFR
for trade policy and  is proxy for geography showing distance from the equator.iGEO
At the second stage the predicted values of respective institutional and openness 
variables are employed in growth equation (equation 1) along with concepts of human 
capital and physical capital.  
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4     Regression Results
Table 1: First Stage Regression Results for Instrumental variables:
First Stage Results
lcopen Impnov Tarshov Tariff Owti Txtrg Totimpov Owqi Ntarfov
Lfrkrom
Engfrac
Eurfrac
Disteq
F-test
2R
0.51
(12.7)*
0.37
(2.4)*
-0.12
(-1.2)
-0.77
(-0.1)
43.9*
0.55
15.9
(7.5)*
16.3
(2.3)*
-5.9
(-1.6)
0.05
(0.57)
17.4*
0.43
27.6
(7.2)*
25.4
(2.01)*
-5.5
(-0.6)
0.1
(0.54)
15.8*
0.41
-1.17
(-1.07)
-0.98
(-0.27)
-3.7
(-1.3)
-0.19
(-3.9)*
5.6*
0.19
-0.07
(-3.7)*
0.004
(0.07)
-0.06
(-1.3)
-0.002
(-2.3)*
6.04*
0.21
0.004
(0.75)
0.002
(0.12)
-0.18
(-1.7)***
-0.001
(-4.04)*
5.9*
0.32
-15.3
(-4.6)*
11.28
(0.99)
-2.18
(-0.32)
0.18
(0.93)
6.1*
0.26
-0.04
(-1.19)
-0.11
(-0.98)
-0.001
(-0.01)
-0.01
(-0.71)
1.04
0.04
-17.79
(-3.01)*
17.06
(0.84)
-28.2
(-2.33)*
-0.27
(-0.77)
3.88*
0.18
                                                                                  First Stage Results
Open80s Leamer82 VA PS GE RQ RL CTC
Lfrkrom
Engfrac
Eurfrac
Disteq
F-test
2R
0.16
(2.55)*
-0.03
(-0.16)
0.16
(1.22)
0.01
(4.03)*
7.6*
0.31
-0.07
(-0.48)
0.16
(0.70)
-0.15
(-0.95)
0.01
(3.99)*
4.7*
0.31
0.86
(2.37)*
0.65
(2.03)*
0.88
(4.47)*
0.02
(7.09)
26.9*
0.43
0.26
(2.88)*
0.24
(0.70)
0.64
(3.04)*
0.02
(6.63)*
17.8*
0.35
0.25
(3.31)*
0.48
(1.6)
0.62
(3.39)*
0.02
(7.37)*
24.3*
0.42
0.097
(1.20)
0.286
(0.88)
0.82
(4.21)*
0.01
(3.76)*
11.9*
0.25
0.27
(3.42)*
0.502
(1.54)
0.51
(2.63)*
0.03
(8.14)*
25.2*
0.42
0.27
(3.53)*
0.73
(2.43)*
0.49
(2.73)*
0.029
(8.08)*
28.2*
0.45
t- values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
It would be interesting to know what information our first stage results give us 
regarding the quality of instruments. Table 1 suggests that for nearly all specifications 
of openness and institutional quality, the respective instruments carry the right signs. 
In some cases where the instruments carry wrong signs, they are also insignificant. 
Before proceeding to our second stage regressions, we tried to see how predicted 
values of our openness and institutional variables relate to economic growth in a 
linear framework. It is interesting to note that the use of instrumental variables 
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provides a much clearer picture of openness/ trade policy and institutions with regard 
to economic growth and establishes the robustness of our instruments.
Moving on to the second stage regression analysis, Table 2a, 2b and 2c (appendix 1) 
provides the results of growth equation with combinations of our 3 openness variables 
with all the institutional concepts under various specifications. The results are very 
similar to the ones obtained by Rodrik et al (2004). Institutions clearly trump 
openness because in most cases it is noted that the latter variable enters into the 
growth equation with the wrong sign. The insignificance of our openness proxies 
capturing the level of trade or movements in terms of trade in explaining long term 
growth rate of a country comes as no surprise. These findings are in accordance with 
the findings of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik (1998), who suggest that the 
correlation of trade levels and growth performance is at best weak in the long run. Our 
results reinforce this fact in a more comprehensive manner as we have provided 
additional specifications to the growth equation by including human capital and 
physical capital. Especially, the inclusion of human capital has improved the 
explanatory power of our model as it is evident from higher values and it has 2R
helped to anchor the influence of institutions in explaining growth. 
In tables 2d, 2e and 2f (appendix 1), we have regressed various measurements of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers along with institutions under different specifications of 
equation 1. Interestingly, we find that institutional superiority vis-a-vis trade policy 
has toned down. In some instances, institutions enter the growth equation 
insignificantly. The frequency of such cases increases when human capital is present 
in equation 1. For example, tables 2d and 2e shows that rule of law enters into the 
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growth equation with a negative sign nearly under all specifications.  This is an 
interesting finding in the light of the Rodrik et al (2004) paper, who employed the rule 
of law as the only proxy for institutions and then go on to claim the superiority of 
institutions over any other process of growth as they find out that rule of law is always 
significant and carries the right sign as opposed to their different openness proxies 
which sometimes carried the wrong signs. Though we also find that institutional 
superiority is unquestioned in a growth equation which has openness proxies, but in 
the presence of trade policy variables the superiority of institutions has diminished 
especially for the rule of law, which has appeared with wrong signs in some cases. 
Additionally we observe from table 2d that voice and accountability and control for 
corruption carry negative signs under specification 4 of the growth equation when 
they are paired with tariffs. 
As far as our trade policy variables are concerned, they also can have wrong signs. 
But unlike Rodrik et al (2004), where in many instances openness variables carry 
wrong signs and were also significant, our trade policy variables which carry wrong 
signs are generally insignificant. For example our proxies of import taxes namely 
tariffs (import duties as percentage of imports) in 2d and totimpov (overall weighted 
average total import charges) in 2f are the trade policy variables which carry wrong 
signs most frequently. But then they are also the ones who have been insignificant 
under all specifications and with any of the institutional combinations respectively. 
There are many studies which have tried to capture the effects of trade policy on 
economic development, i.e., Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) and 
Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) are among the prominent studies which have 
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employed direct proxies of trade policies. They confirm that the countries with policy-
induced barriers to international trade grow at a slower pace. Notwithstanding the 
important role of these studies in giving a useful insight into the ‘trade and growth’ 
debate vis-s-vis trade policy, they have two shortcomings: first, in the light of recent 
evidence provided by Rodrik et al (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2002), their studies 
are likely to suffer from miss-specification bias as they have not taken account of 
institutions in their growth equations. Secondly, they have assumed trade policy to be 
a purely exogenous concept. 
Wood (2004), while commenting on the ‘trade and growth’ debate, not only 
emphasised that a more convincing basis for trade policy recommendations could only 
be provided if trade policy variables are included in the regressions, but also pointed 
out that any such attempt should consider trade policy as an endogenous concept as no 
trade policy recommendations can be given with out taking second best effects into 
account as trade policies crucially depend on the functioning of domestic markets of 
any particular country.
To this effect we have somewhat addressed the endogeneity of trade policy variables 
by regressing them on a set of instruments. Though the instruments remain very 
general in nature they do capture certain country specific characteristics. And as our 
growth equation has institutional proxies and human capital along with trade policy 
variables, our analysis goes one step further from previous cross sectional studies 
which have attempted to find out effects of trade policy on economic development.
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Table 2g and 2h (appendix 1) shows the results of composite measures of openness 
and measures based on residuals, when they are regressed with various institutional 
concepts. Again we find that institutions, though significant in most instances, are not 
the most significant factor in determining economic growth as it was the case in tables 
2a, 2b and 2c. The results suggest that trade liberalisation does matter as open80s in 
2g (Sachs–Warner openness measures) is significant when it enters growth, [whereas 
the three openness variables we employed are all insignificant] for regulatory quality 
and rule of law and leamer82 in 2h (Leamer’s measure of trade restrictiveness based 
on residuals) is highly significant for regulatory quality. 
Here the significance of open80s reinforces the importance of trade policy and gives 
some important insights into the debate. For example, it defines country as open if (i) 
non-tariff barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade, (ii) average tariff rates are less 
than 40 percent, (iii) the black market premium was less than 20 percent during the 
1980s, (iv) the economy is not socialist, and (v) the government does not control 
major exports through marketing boards. The rationale for combining these indicators 
into a single dichotomous variable is that they represent different ways in which 
policy makers can close their economy to international trade. However, according to 
the evidence provided by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), the Sachs-Warner composite 
measure mainly derives its strength from the combination of black market premium 
and the state monopoly of exports, whereas state monopoly on major exports is a 
well-known equivalent between import and export taxes as it captures cases in which 
governments tax major exports and therefore reduce the level of trade (exports and 
imports), and black market premium captures foreign exchange restrictions as a trade 
barrier. Though they accepted state monopoly of exports as an appropriate proxy of 
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trade restrictiveness, they feared that black market premia is not a good choice as it is 
highly correlated with inflation, the debt/exports ratio, wars and institutional quality 
and may simply capture the effect of widespread macroeconomic and political crisis. 
Well to this effect our IV regression analysis solves the problem of endogeneity of 
black market premia as we have regressed open80s with set of institutional and 
openness instruments. It may, therefore, be that both government monopoly over 
major exports and black market premia are robust proxies of trade restrictiveness. 
5 Conclusions
Notwithstanding the importance of institutions, a pertinent question arises as to 
whether institutions rule over trade.  Institutions, whether it is rule of law or voice and 
accountability or political stability or regulatory quality or control of corruption or 
government effectiveness, are all pre requisite for development and are catalyst for the 
success of any development strategy. But the fact remains that institutions or 
institutional development is a long term phenomenon and is not an objective policy 
concept for a short term economic strategy to achieve higher economic growth. That 
is why even after finding institutions to rule over integration, Rodrik et al (2004) 
conclude their paper with following lines: “ How much guidance do our results 
provide to policy makers who want to improve the performance of their economies? 
Not much at all. Sure, it is helpful to know that geography is not destiny, or that 
focusing on increasing the economy’s links with world markets is unlikely to yield 
convergence. But the operational guidance that our central result on the primacy of 
institutional quality yields is extremely meagre.” Our paper, on the contrary, suggests 
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that trade does matter and substantiates the earlier studies regarding the importance of 
trade policy in determining economic growth.
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Appendix 1:
Table 2a: Second Stage Regression Results for Lcopen and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Lcopen -0.77 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.22 0 . 2 1 -0.03 -0.24 -0.63 -0.05 0 . 4 1 0 . 4 1 -0.22 -0.21 -0.14 -0.12 -0.03 -0.29 -0.41 -0.40
(-0.5) (-0.5) (-0.3) (-0.2) (-0.6) (-0.6) (-0.4) (-0.3) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-1.4) (0.19) (-0.5) (-0.4) (1.7)*** (1.7)*** (-2.0)*** (-1.8)*** (-0.8) (-0.7) (-1.1)** (-2.0)** (-2.2)** (-2.0)**
Va 0 . 8 8 0 . 9 0 1 . 3 1 1 . 3 4
(3.7)* (3.8)* (10.6)* (10.9)*
Ps 1 . 0 8 1 . 0 6 1 . 5 5 1 . 5 5
(3.7)* (3.9)* (9.2)* (9.7)*
Ge 1 . 2 6 1 . 2 6 1 . 5 3 1 . 5 5
(3.6)* (3.7)* (10.4)* (10.9)*
Rq 0 . 8 6 0 . 9 4 2 . 1 1 2 . 1 1
(2.6)* (2.8)* (8.2)* (8.7)*
Rl 0 . 9 7 0 . 9 7 1 . 3 7 1 . 4 0
(4.2)* (4.4)* (11.9)* (12.4)*
Ctc 0 . 8 5 0 . 8 8 1 . 4 2 1 . 4 8
(3.6)* (3.6)* (10.9)* (11.3)*
Hk 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 2 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 5 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 4 0 . 1 3
(2.6)* (2.6)* (1 .6 ) (1.7)*** ( 0 .6 ) (0 .6 ) (3.8)* (3.8)* (1.7)*** (1.8)*** (2.1)** (2.0)**
Pk 0.006 0 . 0 2 -0.11 -0.01 0.001 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 2 -0.005 -0.007 0.009 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 2
(0 .5 ) (1.6)*** (-0.7) (-0.8) (0 .1 ) (0.02) (-0.03) (-0.3) (-0.1) (0 .8 ) (1 .6 ) (1 .5 )
F-test 60.0* 81.3* 40.4* 60.4* 46.6* 66.1* 30.2* 47.3* 47.5* 65.2* 38.7* 60.1* 71.0* 93.5* 24.9* 38.9* 84.2* 1 1 6 . 3 * 51.8* 78.2* 70.1* 91.2* 44.3* 65.1*
R2 0 . 6 9 0 . 6 9 0 . 4 2 0 . 4 0 0 . 6 2 0 . 6 3 0 . 2 6 0 . 2 7 0 . 6 2 0 . 6 2 0 . 4 2 0 . 4 2 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 5 0 . 1 3 0 . 1 4 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 9 0 . 5 5 0 . 5 5 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 3 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 6
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values and thus n takes the range from approximately 30 to 140, while generally taking the value of 70.
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Table 2b: Second Stage Regression Results for Impnov and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Impnov -0.004 -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.9) (-0.9) (-1.3) (-1.3) (-1.5) (-1.6) (-1.6) (-1.5) (-1.8)*** (-1.8)*** (-2.2)** (-2.0)** (-0.5) (-0.5) (0 .2 ) (0 .2 ) (-1.8)*** (1.9)*** (-1.9)*** (1.8)*** (-1.8)*** (-1.9)*** (-2.6)** (-2.0)**
Va 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 4 1 . 3 9 1 . 4 6
(2.8)* (2.6)* (8.6)* (8.8)*
Ps 1 . 1 0 1 . 0 7 1 . 5 0 1 . 5 4
(2.9)* (2.9)* (8.4)* (8.6)*
Ge 1 . 5 8 1 . 5 4 1 . 5 1 1 . 5 6
(2.4)** (2.4)** (9.5)* (9.6)*
Rq 0 . 7 2 0 . 6 8 2 . 1 7 2 . 1 8
(2.2)** (1.9)*** (7.6)* (8.2)*
Rl 0 . 8 9 0 . 8 7 1 . 3 8 1 . 4 1
(2.8)* (2.8)* (10.6)* (11.1)*
Ctc 0 . 8 9 0 . 9 7 1 . 3 6 1 . 4 7
(2.3)* (2.3)* (10.1)* (9.9)*
Hk 0 . 1 7 0 . 1 9 0 . 0 9 0 . 1 1 -0.04 -0.01 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 5 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 3 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 1
(2.4)** (2.9)* (1 .0 ) (1 .2 ) (-0.4) (-0.1) (4.3)* (4.1)* (1 .5 ) (1 .6 ) (1 .1 ) (1 .0 )
Pk 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 -0.01 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 4
(1.7)*** (1.8)*** ( 0 .6 ) (0 .8 ) (1 .1 ) (1 .2 ) (0.58) (-0.2) (0.72) (0 .6 ) (2.2)** (2.5)**
F-test 51.7* 69.1* 29.1* 39.9* 39.0* 53.3* 26.5* 37.8* 26.9* 36.6* 34.4* 47.4* 67.3* 91.7* 22.9* 34.3* 65.6* 87.6* 44.2* 63.4* 48.6* 54.6* 40.4* 50.8*
R2 0 . 7 1 0 . 7 0 0 . 3 9 0 . 3 4 0 . 6 2 0 . 6 3 0 . 3 6 0 . 3 3 0 . 4 5 0 . 4 5 0 . 4 9 0 . 4 5 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 8 0 . 2 9 0 . 3 0 0 . 7 7 0 . 7 7 0 . 6 1 0 . 6 1 0 . 7 0 0 . 6 4 0 . 5 7 0 . 4 9
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values and thus n takes the range from approximately 30 to 140, while generally taking the value of 70.
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Table 2c: Second Stage Regression Results for Tarshov and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Tarshov -0.003 -0.003 -0.01 -0.01 -0.005 -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 -0.005 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.0) (-1.0) (-1.4) (-1.4) (-1.5) (-1.6) (-1.5) (-1.4) (-1.8)*** (-1.6) (-2.1)** (-1.9)** (-0.8) (-0.8) (-0.01) ( 0 .1 ) (-1.8)*** (1.9)*** (-1..7)*** ( - 1 . 6 ) (-1.9)*** (-1.9)*** (-2.5)** (-2.3)**
Va 0 . 7 7 0 . 7 2 1 . 4 1 1 . 4 8
(2.7)* (2.6)* (8.4)* (8.6)*
Ps 1 . 3 0 1 . 0 1 1 . 5 1 . 5 4
(2.9)* (2.9)* (8.3)* (8.5)*
Ge 1 . 4 2 1 . 0 1 1 . 5 1 1 . 5 7
(2.5)** (2.6)* (9.3)* (9.5)*
Rq 0 . 7 3 0 . 6 8 2 . 1 7 2 . 1 9
(2.2)** (1.9)*** (7.6)* (8.1)*
Rl 0 . 8 1 0 . 7 9 1 . 3 8 1 . 4 1
(2.8)* (2.7)* (10.4)* (10.9)*
Ctc 0 . 7 9 0 . 8 6 1 . 3 1 . 4 7
(2.3)* (2.3)** (9 .9)* (9.9)*
Hk 0 . 1 7 0 . 2 0 0 . 1 1 0 . 1 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 2 4 0 . 2 5 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 5 0 . 0 4
(2.6)** (2.9)* (1 .4 ) (1 .5 ) (0 .1 ) (1 .5 ) (4.3)* (4.1)* (1.9)** (2.1)** ( 1 .6 ) (1 .6 ) (2.5)**
Pk 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 -0.004 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 3
(1.7)*** (1.8)*** ( 0 .6 ) 0 . 7 9 (1 .1 ) (1 .1 ) ( 0 . 7 ) (-0.18) (0.73) (0 .6 ) (2.2)**
F-test 52.3* 69.5* 28.1* 38.5* 41.8* 57.2* 25.8* 37.1* 31.2* 57.2* 33.2* 46.3* 66.3* 9 0 . 2 * 23.1* 34.3* 68.7* 91.6* 44.8* 62.1* 5 2 . 4 * 60.2* 39.1* 49.7*
R2 0 . 7 1 0 . 7 1 0 . 3 7 0 . 3 1 0 . 6 5 0 . 6 6 0 . 3 5 0 . 3 3 0 . 5 2 0 . 6 6 0 . 4 8 0 . 4 4 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 8 0 . 3 0 0 . 3 0 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 8 0 . 6 0 0 . 5 9 0 . 7 2 0 . 6 7 0 . 5 6 0 . 4 8
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values and thus n takes the range from approximately 30 to 140, while generally taking the value of 70.
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Table 2d: Second Stage Regression Results for Tariffs and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Tariffs 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 2 0 . 4 4 -0.39 0.001 0.003 -0.06 -0.14 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 -0.06 -0.18 -0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.19 -0.01 -0.003 -0.12 -0.21 0.001 0.007 -0.18 -0.27
(0 .5 ) (0 .5 ) (0 .4 ) -0.21 (0.02) (0 .1 ) (-0.8) (-0.9) (0 .5 ) (0 .6 ) (-0.6) (-0.7) (-0.2) (-0.1) (-1.5) (-1.4) (-0.3) (-0.1) (-1.4) (-1.1) (0 .1 ) (0.16) (-1.1) (-1.1)
Va 1 . 0 4 1 . 0 4 4 . 0 4 -0.97
(2.9)* (3.0)* (0 .6 ) (-0.1)
Ps 0 . 8 9 0 . 8 9 1 . 0 8 0 . 6 1
(3.3)* (3.4)* (1.9)*** ( 0 .6 )
Ge 1 . 0 1 1 . 0 8 0 . 9 8 0 . 3 3
(2.6)* (2.6)* (1 .4 ) (0 .2 )
Rq 1 . 1 0 1 . 1 8 1 . 0 1 0 . 4 9
(1.8)*** (1.9)*** ( 0 .9 ) (0 .3 )
Rl 0 . 6 8 0 . 7 1 0 . 6 2 0 . 1 9
(3.3)* (3.4)* (1 .1 ) (0 .2 )
Ctc 0 . 5 6 0 . 6 2 0 . 2 2 -0.19
(2.3)** (2.4)** ( 0 .2 ) (-0.1)
Hk 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 7 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 6 0 . 1 9 0 . 1 8 0 . 1 7 0 . 1 8 0 . 2 1 0 . 2 1
(1.8)*** (1.8)*** (1.9)** (2.1)** (1.8)*** (1.7)*** (2.3)** (2.1)** (2.7)* (2.8)* (2.9)* (2.9)*
Pk 0.001 0.003 0.001 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 -0.01 -0.01 0.001 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1
(0 .1 ) (0 .1 ) (0 .1 ) (0 .4 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .8 ) (-0.4) (-0.2) (0 .2 ) (0 .3 ) (1 .1 ) (0 .4 )
F-test 43.8* 61.7* 2.3*** 4 . 7 * 52.9* 71.5* 32.1* 26.5* 41.2* 50.1* 33.4* 17.9* 51.5* 67.6* 17.6* 17.3* 86.3* 114.7* 22.7* 15.8* 62.6* 80.2* 11.6* 9 . 3 *
R2 0 . 6 7 0 . 6 7 - - 0 . 7 3 0 . 7 2 0 . 4 8 0 . 0 1 0 . 6 6 0 . 6 1 0 . 5 1 - 0 . 7 3 0 . 7 2 0 . 0 4 - 0 . 8 3 0 . 8 2 0 . 2 6 - 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 6 - -
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values as in cross section analysis this may lead to spurious results. Thus ‘n’ takes the range from approximately 30 to 70 (in case of specification 1) 
70 to  140 (in case of specification 4), where as mostly it has taken the range of 60 – 70.
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Table 2e: Second Stage Regression Results for Owti and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Owti 0 . 2 9 0 . 3 6 0 . 4 2 0 . 3 6 1 . 1 5 0 . 9 2 0 . 2 3 -0.07 4 . 6 6 3 . 9 8 3 . 1 8 2 . 5 3 -1.48 -1.45 - 2 . 3 - 2 . 3 -0.58 -0.39 0 . 0 2 -0.21 0 . 4 1 0 . 8 2 1 . 8 7 1 . 7 5
(0 .2 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .5 ) (0 .4 ) (0 .1 ) (-0.03) (0 .9 ) (0 .9 ) (1 .1 ) (0 .9 ) (-1.3) (-1.3) (-1.1) (-1.1) (-0.4) (-0.3) (0.01) (-0.1) (0 .2 ) (0 .4 ) (0.81) (0 .7 )
Va 0 . 8 1 0 . 7 8 1 . 4 4 1 . 4 6
(2.3)** (2.3)** (5.3)* (5.5)*
Ps 1 . 3 1 1 . 2 7 1 . 4 9 1 . 4 8
(2.1)** (2.1)** (5.4)* (5.6)*
Ge 2 . 1 2 1 . 9 8 1 . 7 5 1 . 7 1
(1 .5 ) (1 .6 ) (4.9)* (5.5)*
Rq 0 . 4 5 0 . 4 2 1 . 8 7 1 . 9 3
(1 .2 ) (1 .1 ) (4.6)* (4.9)*
Rl 0 . 5 1 0 . 5 7 1 . 3 4 1 . 3 4
(1 .3 ) (1 .6 ) (6.4)* (6.8)*
Ctc 0 . 6 6 0 . 7 4 1 . 4 6 1 . 4 9
(1 .5 ) (1 .6 ) (5.7)* (6.1)*
Hk 0 . 1 7 0 . 1 9 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 5 -0.09 -0.07 0 . 2 5 0 . 2 6 0 . 2 0 0 . 9 1 0 . 1 9 0 . 1 8
(2.4)* (2.6)* (0 .3 ) (0 .4 ) (-0.3) (-0.3) (4.1)* (3.6)* (2.2)** (2.1)** (1.9)** (1.8)**
Pk 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 -0.01 0.001 -0.02 -0.01 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0.005 0.001 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1
(1 .2 ) (1 .2 ) (-0.4) (0.02) (-0.6) (-0.5) (0 .6 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .4 ) (0 .1 ) (1 .1 ) (0 .7 )
F-test 45.9* 62.7* 27.5* 41.4* 26.1* 38.1* 26.4* 41.7* 11.8* 1.89* 22.2* 38.3* 62.8* 87.0* 25.4* 38.5* 76.1* 102.7* 43.0* 66.7* 55.4* 67.9* 32.9* 50.7*
R2 0 . 6 9 0 . 6 9 0 . 3 8 0 . 3 7 0 . 4 8 0 . 5 2 0 . 3 9 0 . 4 1 - 0 . 0 1 0 . 2 5 0 . 3 3 0 . 7 8 0 . 7 9 0 . 3 9 0 . 3 8 0 . 8 2 0 . 8 2 0 . 6 2 0 . 6 3 0 . 7 6 0 . 7 3 0 . 5 0 0 . 5 0
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values as in cross section analysis this may lead to spurious results. Thus ‘n’ takes the range from approximately 30 to 70 (in case of specification 1) 
70 to  140 (in case of specification 4), where as mostly it has taken the range of 60 – 70.
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Table 2f: Second Stage Regression Results for Totimpov and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
totimpo 0.012 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 3 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 4 0.005 0.005 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0.005 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 4 0 . 0 3
(0 .7 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .9 ) (0 .9 ) (1 .1 ) (0 .9 ) (1.7)*** (1.8)*** ( 0 .7 ) (0 .8 ) (0 .6 ) (0 .6 ) (0 .6 ) (0 .7 ) (1 .5 ) (1 .5 ) (0 .6 ) (0 .6 ) (1.9)*** (2.1)**
Va 1 . 9 4 1 . 7 0 1 . 9 4 1 . 9 1
(1 .3 ) (1 .3 ) (3.1)* (3.5)*
Ps 0 . 3 1 0 . 2 6 1 . 0 2 1 . 1 1
(1 .1 ) (1 .0 ) (3.3)* (3.7)*
Ge 1 . 6 1 2 . 4 2 . 4 2 . 4
(1 .1 ) (0 .8 ) (2.8)* (3.2)*
Rq 0 . 3 3 0 . 2 5 1 . 3 4 1 . 5 4
(1 .0 ) (0 .7 ) (3.7)* (4.1)*
Rl 0 . 1 5 0 . 1 1 1 . 9 1 . 8
(0 .3 ) (0 .2 ) (2.9)* (3.8)*
Ctc 3 . 6 6 2 . 7 0 2 . 6 2 . 4 3
(0 .5 ) (0 .5 ) (2.9)* (3.7)*
Hk -0.04 -0.03 0 . 3 0 0 . 3 2 0 . 0 9 -0.06 0 . 2 9 0 . 3 1 0 . 3 1 0 . 3 3 -0.17 - -0 .05
(-0.1) (-0.1) (5.2)* (6.0)* (0 .4 ) (-0.1) (4.2)* (4.3)* (2.7)* (2.9)* (-0.2) (-0.1)
Pk -0.02 -0.01 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 4 -0.02 -0.02 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.4) (-0.03) (0 .9 ) (1.8)*** (-0.5) (-0.6) (0 .6 ) (0 .9 ) (0 .5 ) (-0.6) (-0.2) (-0.4)
F-test 4.29* 6.54* 4.05* 6.25* 19.5* 26.1* 5 . 9 * 7.12* 6.41* 4.54* 3 . 4 * 5 . 1 * 20.8* 27.9* 7 . 3 2 8 . 5 * 21.4* 28.03* 4 . 4 * 7 . 2 * 1 . 7 7 4 . 0 * 4.04** 6.89*
R2 - - - - 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 9 - - - - - - 0 . 6 3 0 . 6 3 0 . 2 2 0 . 1 6 0 . 6 4 0 . 6 3 - - 0 . 1 5 - - -
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values as in cross section analysis this may lead to spurious results. Thus ‘n’ takes the range from approximately 30 to 70 (in case of specification 1) 
70 to  140 (in case of specification 4), where as mostly it has taken the range of 60 – 70.
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Table 2g: Second Stage Regression Results for Open80 and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capital Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Open80 0 . 6 8 0 . 5 9 0 . 5 3 0 . 4 4 1 . 7 9 1 . 4 2 0 . 6 4 0 . 5 0 2 . 0 1 1 . 8 2 0 . 0 5 -0.08 1 . 1 4 1 . 1 2 2 . 2 5 2 . 1 9 1 . 8 6 1 . 8 5 2 . 5 0 2 . 4 1 . 9 8 2 . 0 1 1 . 9 7 2 . 0 5
(0.59) (0.53) (0.39) (0.32) (0 .9 ) (0 .9 ) (0 .3 ) (0.27) (0 .8 ) (0 .7 ) (0.03) (-0.1) (1.2)*** (1.9)*** (1.9)*** (1.8)*** (1.7)*** (1.7)*** ( 1 .4 ) (1 .4 ) (1 .3 ) (1 .4 ) (1.12) (1 .1 )
Va 0 . 2 6 0 . 2 9 1 . 1 5 1 . 2 0
(0.51) (0.58) (2.6)* (2.7)*
Ps -0.47 0 . 2 0 1 . 3 0 1 . 3 5
(-0.3) (-0.2) (1 .8) * * * (2.0)***
Ge -0.48 - 0 . 3 9 1 . 3 1 1 . 3 6
(-0.3) (-0.3) (2.3)*** (2.5)**
Rq 0 . 3 0 0 . 3 4 1 . 2 3 1 . 3 0
(0 .5 ) (0 .6 ) (1.7)*** (1.8)***
Rl -0.45 -0.47 0 . 4 7 0 . 5 3
(-0.8) (-0.8) (0.87) (1 .0 )
Ctc - 0 . 4 -0.39 0 . 6 0 0 . 6 0
(-0.6) (-0.7) (1 .2 ) (1 .1 )
Hk 0 . 2 7 0 . 2 7 0 . 3 8 0 . 3 4 0 . 3 8 0 . 3 8 0 . 2 6 0 . 2 5 0 . 4 1 0 . 4 1 0 . 3 6 0 . 3 7
(3.6)* (3.63)* ( 1 .5 ) (1 .5 ) (1 .5 ) (1 .5 ) (2.8)* (2.8)* (2.9)* (3.0)* (3.2)* (3.4)*
Pk 0.008 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 -0.002 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0.008 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0.006 0 . 0 3
(0 .7 ) (0.83) ( 0 . 5 ) (-0.1) (0 .6 ) (0 .2 ) (0 .4 ) (0 .3 ) (0 .7 ) (0 .9 ) (0 .3 ) (1 .6 )
F-test 61.3* 84.4* 31.0* 10.6* 26.1* 48.4* 18.1* 26.4* 2 2 . 1 * 33.9* 27.3* 39.4* 42.8* 57.6* 14.5* 21.8* 25.7* 3 4 . 5 16.1* 24.5* 23.5* 31.0* 21.6* 29.3*
R2 0 . 8 3 0 . 8 3 0 . 6 1 0 . 5 9 0 . 6 2 0 . 7 2 0 . 3 7 0 . 3 6 0 . 5 5 0 . 6 0 0 . 5 8 0 . 5 6 0 . 7 6 0 . 7 5 0 . 1 9 0 . 1 9 0 . 6 0 0 . 5 9 0 . 3 0 0 . 3 2 0 . 5 6 0 . 5 5 0 . 4 8 0 . 4 3
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values as in cross section analysis this may lead to spurious results. Thus ‘n’ takes the range from approximately 30 to 70 (in case of specification 1) 
70 to  140 (in case of specification 4), where as mostly it has taken the range of 60 – 70.
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Table 2h: Second Stage Regression Results for Leamer82 and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Inde-
pendent
Variable
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Leamer
82
0 . 3 2 0 . 2 8 0 . 4 0 0 . 3 5 -0.02 0 . 1 0 -0.02 -0.03 -0.14 -0.03 -0.11 -0.17 1 . 2 6 1 . 4 1 1 . 4 7 1 . 4 6 -0.36 -0.14 -0.42 -0.35 -0.35 -0.21 -0.12 -0.21
(0.79) (0.73) (0.91) (0.77) (-0.04) (0.21) (-0.03) (-0.05) ( -0 .3) (-0.08) (-0.17) (-0.25) (2.14)** (2.2)** (3.9)* (3.9)* (-0.87) (-0.4) ( -0 .4) (-0.43) (-0.7) ( -0 .5) (-0.17) (-0.28)
Va 0 . 8 2 0 . 8 1 1 . 0 2 1 . 0 5
(3.87)* (3.85)* (6.2)* (6.18)*
Ps 0 . 9 3 0 . 9 2 1 . 2 8 1 . 3 1
(2.9)* (3.08)* (3.45)* (3.67)*
Ge 0 . 9 9 0 . 9 9 1 . 1 7 1 . 2 1
(3.2)* (3.3)* (4.4)* (4.6)*
Rq 1 . 6 2 1 . 7 9 1 . 6 6 1 . 7 1
(2.6)** (2.6)** (5.09)* (5.34)*
Rl 0 . 9 1 0 . 8 4 1 . 1 9 1 . 1 8
(3.8)* (3 .8)* (3.6)* (3.9)*
Ctc 0 . 7 4 0 . 7 1 0 . 9 8 1 . 0 1
(2.9)* (3.5)* (4.14)* (4.4)*
Hk 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 8 0 . 0 7 0 . 0 6 0.029 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 -0.008 0 . 0 5 0 . 0 6 0 . 0 9 0 . 0 9
(1.02) (1.19) (0.81) (0.77) (0.32) (0.23) (0.19) (-0.06) (0.78) (0.85) (1.14) (1.21)
Pk 0 . 0 1 0 . 2 9 -0.01 0 . 0 1 -0.001 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 2 -0.02 -0.003 -0.008 0.018
(1.03) (1.9)*** (-0.52) (0.41) (-0.11) (0.97) (1.17) (1.28) ( -1 .4) -0.11 (-0.44) (0.88)
F-test 42.4* 57.8* 47.1* 62.5* 26.3* 38.6* 16.1* 23.5* 37.6* 53.4* 28.0* 38.5* 30.5* 34.7* 34.4* 49.6* 49.7* 73.9* 19.8* 31.2* 34.5* 54.3* 27.4* 38.2*
R2 0 . 8 2 0 . 8 1 0 . 8 1 0 . 7 9 0 . 7 1 0 . 7 2 0 . 4 8 0 . 4 6 0 . 8 0 0 . 8 0 0 . 7 1 0 . 6 7 0 . 7 6 0 . 7 0 0 . 7 5 0 . 7 4 0 . 8 5 0 . 8 6 0 . 5 9 0 . 6 1 0 . 7 8 0 . 8 1 0 . 7 1 0 . 6 8
        -       t- values in the paranthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- We have not generated the missing values as in cross section analysis this may lead to spurious results. Thus ‘n’ takes the range from approximately 30 to 70 (in case of specification 1) 
70 to  140 (in case of specification 4), where as mostly it has taken the range of 60 – 70.
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Appendix 2:
Data and Sources:
Ctc: Control of Corruption, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al.
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002)
Engfrac: Fraction of te population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002)
Eurfrac: Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: English, 
French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002)
Ge: Government Effectiveness, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al.
Hk:  Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year, 1999. Source: Barro & Lee.
Impnov: Import Penetration Overall, 1985, Source: Rose (2002).
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) imports plus 
exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6..
Leamer82: Leamer’s Measure of Openness based on Residuals, Year: 1982. Source: Rose (2002).
Logfrankrom: Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel and Romer 
(1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: Frankel and Romer 
(1999).
LnY: Natural logarithm of Per Capita Income at purchasing Power Prices (PPP), Year: 2000. Source: 
World Development Indicators (WDI), 2002.
Open80: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002).
Owti: Tariffs on intermediate inputs and Capital Goods, Year: 1985, Source: Barro and Lee
Pk: Gross Capital Formation as a percentage of GDP, Year: 2000. Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 2002.
Ps: Political Stability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al.
Rl: Rule of Law, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al.
Rq: Regulatory Quality, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al.
Tariffs: Import Duties as percentage imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development Indicators 
(WDI), 2002.
Tarshov: TARS trade Penetration Overall, Year: 1985, Source: Rose (2002) 
Totimpov: Weighted Average Total Import Charges, Overall, Year: 1985. Source: Rose (2002).
Va: Voice and Accountability, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al.
